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A generalized aggregation-disintegration model
for the frequency of severe terrorist attacks∗
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We present and analyze a model of the frequency of severe terrorist attacks, which generalizes
the recently proposed model of Johnson et al. This model, which is based on the notion of
self-organized criticality and which describes how terrorist cells might aggregate and disintegrate
over time, predicts that the distribution of attack severities should follow a power-law form with
an exponent of α = 5/2. This prediction is in good agreement with current empirical estimates
for terrorist attacks worldwide, which give αˆ = 2.4 ± 0.2, and which we show is independent of
certain details of the model. We close by discussing the utility of this model for understanding
terrorism and the behavior of terrorist organizations, and mention several productive ways it could
be extended mathematically or tested empirically.
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Richardson’s Law – one of the few robust statistical
regularities in studies of political conflict – states that
the distribution of casualties in violent conflicts follows a
power-law form, in which the probability of an event with
x deaths is p(x) ∝ x−α where α is a parameter called
the scaling exponent [5, 32, 33]. Recent studies have
used rigorous statistical methods to confirm this statisti-
cal law for wars between 1816 and 1980 [9, 28], and have
extended it to cover the severity of individual terrorist
attacks, worldwide from 1968 to 2008 [9, 10].
Although Richardson’s original interest in violent con-
flicts were inclusive of both wars and homicides, most
research on the severity of conflicts has focused on
wars and other large-scale events, characterizing them
mainly dichotomously according to their incidence or
absence (with some exceptions; see Cederman [5] and
Lacina [22]). Research on terrorism has tended to be sim-
ilarly focused [23], with considerable additional attention
paid to its strategic elements [15, 29]. As a result, little
is known systematically about what factors and mech-
anisms influence the severity of terrorist attacks. This
ignorance is exacerbated in part by the extreme scarcity
of systematic, quantitative data on, for instance, the re-
cruitment, fundraising, decision making, and structure
of terrorist organizations, or on the counter-terrorism ef-
forts of states. But, good-quality data on terrorist at-
tacks themselves do exist, and their systematic analy-
sis led to the discovery that Richard’s Law includes the
severity of terrorist attacks.
Power-law distributions have recently attracted a great
deal of interest across the sciences, and have been found
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to characterize the distribution of a wide variety of nat-
ural and social phenomena. Examples of power-law dis-
tributed quantities include earthquakes, floods and forest
fires [3, 24, 28], as well as city sizes, citation counts for sci-
entific papers, the number of participants in strikes, and
the frequency of words in written language [4, 28, 36, 40].
These distributions are scientifically interesting because
they depart dramatically from Central Limit Theorem
assumptions of normality (or even log-normality), and
extremely large or severe events are orders of magnitude
more likely than would normally be expected. Further,
the discovery that an empirical quantity follows a power-
law distribution suggests certain unusual kinds of mecha-
nistic explanations for their origin, e.g., mechanisms that
rely on long-range correlations, long-term memory ef-
fects, or positive feedbacks. In the case of terrorism, an
understanding of the social or political mechanisms the
govern the frequency of severe terrorist attacks would
have strong implications for security policies. (Readers
unfamiliar with power-law distributions can refer to Ap-
pendix A for a brief primer, or to reviews by Kleiber and
Kotz [20], Newman [28] and Mitzenmacher [26].)
For terrorist attacks, recent analyses of empirical data
suggest that the distribution of event severities, i.e., the
number of deaths or casualties, follows such a power law,
and that this statistical pattern has been largely stable
over the past 40 years despite large changes in the global
political system over the same period [10]. (For con-
creteness, we reproduce this result from Clauset, Young,
and Gleditsch in Fig. 1.) Clauset, Young, and Gled-
itsch further showed that the severity of terrorist attacks
remains power-law distributed, although with different
scaling exponents, even after controlling for the type
of weapon used (e.g., firearms, explosives, etc.) or the
level of economic development of the target country, but
not when controlling for geographic region (e.g., North
America, Europe, etc.) or tactic (e.g., hostage, assassi-
nation, suicide bombing). Other studies of the severity
of such attacks go further, suggesting that the frequency
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FIG. 1: The severities (number of deaths) for 13,274 fatal
terrorist attacks worldwide from 1968–2008 [27]. The data are
plotted as a complementary cumulative distribution function
Pr(X ≥ x). The solid black line shows the power-law behavior
of the distribution, with scaling exponent αˆ = 2.4 ± 0.2 for
x ≥ 10 [9].
and severity of events within individual conflicts, such
as those in Colombia and Iraq, exhibit power-law statis-
tics [6, 18, 19], and that observable changes in the power
law’s exponent over time are indicative of real and im-
portant shifts in the underlying dynamics of the social
and political generative processes.
At present, these ubiquitous power-law statistics lack
a clear and well-supported explanation: what mecha-
nisms, political or otherwise, give rise to these law-like
behaviors? A scientific answer to this question may ulti-
mately shed light, in a manner complementary to tradi-
tional studies, on the use of such tactics in violent con-
flicts [23, 29], the internal dynamics of terrorist organi-
zations [7, 11], and trends in global terrorism [14, 38].
It may also shed light on the connection between sever-
ity and other modalities [8], e.g., location and timing,
suggest novel intervention strategies or policy recommen-
dations for counter-terrorism [12], and shed light on the
connection between terrorism and other kinds of violent
conflicts, such as civil and international wars [33, 37].
To date, two explanations have been proposed for the
origin of the observed power law in the frequency of
severe terrorist attacks.1 One, proposed by Clauset,
1 We note that a wide variety of mechanisms can produce power-
law distributions. Most of these processes, however, are not well-
suited for explaining the severity of terrorist attacks (see Clauset,
Young, and Gleditsch [10] for some discussion). As such, we focus
our attention on the two mechanisms that have been proposed,
both of which have some empirical support.
Young, and Gleditsch [10] relies on an exponential sam-
pling mechanism in which states and terrorists compete
to decide which planned events become real. In this
model, terrorists invest time planning events and the po-
tential severity of these increases roughly exponentially
with the total planning time. Through counter-terrorism
actions by states, along with other natural attrition fac-
tors, these potential events are then strongly sampled,
with the probability that a potential event becomes real
decreasing roughly exponentially with the size of the
event. That is, large events are exponentially less likely
to become real than smaller events. The competition of
these two exponentials produces a power-law distribu-
tion in the severity of events, with the scaling exponent
α depending only on the two exponential rates.
The second mechanism, proposed by Johnson et al. [18,
19], is a self-organized critical model [3] of the internal dy-
namics of a modern terrorist organization. In this model,
a terrorist organization is composed of cells that merge
and fall apart according to simple probabilistic rules (see
below). The long-term dynamics of this aggregation-
disintegration process produces a dynamic equilibrium or
steady-state that is characterized by a power-law distri-
bution in the sizes of cells, and, by assumption, a power-
law distribution in the severity of events. In this model
the scaling exponent in the steady-state can be calcu-
lated exactly, and is found to be α = 5/2. This value is
in good agreement with the best current empirical esti-
mate of αˆ = 2.4± 0.2 [9] for terrorist attacks worldwide
from 1968 to 2008.
In this article, we mathematically study the Johnson
et al. model. In particular, we generalize Johnson et al.’s
specific model to a family of such models. We then ana-
lytically solve for their steady-state behavior, and show
that a power-law distribution is a universal feature2 of
this class of models. That is, provided the number N of
radicalized individuals is large N ≫ 1, the appearance of
the power-law distribution and the value of its scaling ex-
ponent α does not depend on certain details of the model
itself. Mathematically speaking: our analysis is exact in
the limit N →∞. We note that our asymptotic analysis
is done purely for mathematical convenience; the limit
N → ∞ has no social meaning and so long as N is very
large, our results should hold.
The benefits of generalizing the Johnson et al. model
are two fold. First, there is the generalization itself,
which extends the model in a new and important direc-
tion, and demonstrates that the model’s main qualita-
tive result—the power-law distribution in event sizes—is
robust to certain specific modeling assumptions. Sec-
2 Here, universality denotes the robustness of certain qualitative
features of a mathematical model to certain specific modeling
assumptions. This usage is distinct from, and should not be
confused with, the less technical usage of the same term to denote
a natural or social phenomenon that appears to be independent
of certain contingent or contextual details.
3ond, by carefully describing the model’s assumptions and
then mathematically working out their consequences, we
can more precisely identify which empirical tests are ul-
timately necessary to support or refute the model’s as-
sumptions and predictions. This approach defers answer-
ing the question of what mechanism produces the power-
law distribution in the frequency of severe terrorist at-
tacks; however, this seems acceptable partly because of
the complexity of the model and its analysis, and partly
because of our currently very limited knowledge of the
social and political processes that might give rise to the
power-law distribution. This model-based approach can
thus highlight which empirical facts it would be useful to
know and stimulate research in productive directions.
I. THE MODEL
The model we analyze is based on five assumptions
about the interaction of the terrorist cells that make up
a modern terrorist organization. We make no other as-
sumptions about the relationship between these cells and
the conflict or the terrorist organization they inhabit, the
mode of attack or tactic used by an attacking cell, or that
this model represents the behavior of hierarchical terror-
ist organizations.
Although these assumptions are straightforward to
state, and allow us to mathematically analyze their con-
sequences, they embody strong and possibly unrealistic
constraints on the internal dynamics of terrorist groups
that have not yet been systematically tested with em-
pirical data. At present, however, this model is worth-
while to study mainly because it yields one prediction—a
power-law distribution in the frequency and severity of
events—that agrees relatively well with a wide range of
empirical data [6, 9, 10, 18, 19]. By carefully explor-
ing the behavior of this model, we can identify quan-
titative predictions or critical assumptions that may be
tested using the available empirical data. In our conclud-
ing remarks, we discuss some of these tests and possible
extensions of the model that relax some of the model’s
assumptions.
The five model assumptions are
1. There is a “pool” of N radicalized individuals that
are “inclined” toward terrorism. We assume N
to be large N ≫ 1 and to be constant in time.
This latter assumption implies that terrorists who
are eliminated for any reason, e.g., by counter-
terrorism measures, inter- or intra-cell conflict, per-
sonal preferences, or in the course of their attacks,
are replaced immediately by an equal number of
radicalized individuals.
2. These individuals can form cells of size 1, 2, 3, 4, . . .
Let nk denote the number of cells consisting of
k = 1, 2, 3, . . . individuals.
3. Cells grow by a process of aggregation, in which any
pair of cells can merge to form a larger cell. Specif-
ically, we assume that any pair of cells consisting of
k and ℓ individuals respectively has a probability
A0(k ℓ)
a per unit time to combine into a cell of size
k+ ℓ. Here A0 > 0 and a ≥ 0 are parameters of the
model, and we analyze the model for general a. To
be realistic when comparing with data, however, we
choose a ∼= 1 to represent the fact that the num-
ber of possible human relations between members
of the two cells is k ℓ, i.e., it scales linearly with the
product of the cell sizes.
4. Cells fall apart or “disintegrate” spontaneously into
single individuals. Let b(k) denote the probability
per unit time that a given cell of k individuals will
disintegrate spontaneously into k cells of size one,
and where b(1) = 0. The explicit form of the func-
tion b(k) is not needed to calculate the equilibrium
distribution of cell size, provided one studies the
asymptotic region N ≫ 1.
5. At any time, any cell can launch an attack. For
simplicity, we assume that the attack occurs with
probability (per unit time) that is independent of
the cell’s size, its “age”, the number of attacks it
has previously launched, etc., and that the severity
v(k) of an attack is roughly proportional to the
cell’s size k, i.e., v(k) ∝ k, for 1≪ k ≪ N .
To be precise, the number of possible pairings of a k-cell
with a ℓ-cell, i.e., the number of potential combinations
between some cell of size k and some cell of size ℓ, equals
nknℓ for k 6= ℓ, and 12nk(nk − 1) for k = ℓ. However, if
N ≫ 1, we shall find that all nk ≫ 1; in this case we can
approximate 12nk(nk − 1) ∼= 12n2k, which simplifies the
mathematics considerably but does not fundamentally
alter the results.
Our analysis of this model will show that the steady-
state distribution of the sizes of the terrorist cells follows
a power-law distribution with exponent α = 5/2. By as-
sumption 5, that the severity of an attack is proportional
to the size of the attacking cell, this then implies that
the distribution of event severities follows a power-law
distribution with the same exponent.
II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF CELL SIZES IN
THE STEADY STATE
From the five assumptions discussed above, we can
write down the equation for how nk(t) changes with time
for k = 2, 3, . . .
dnk
dt
=
1
2
A0
∞∑
i,j=1
′
iajaninj −A0kank
∞∑
j=1
janj − b(k)nk ,
(1)
4where
∑′
denotes a summation over all natural numbers
i and j such that
i+ j = k . (2)
The equation for dn1/dt is not needed in our analysis.
In words, the first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (1)
represents the increase of the number of cells of size k
because of the aggregation of two smaller cells, the second
term measures the decrease of this number because such a
cell can itself merge with another cell, and the third term
represents the loss of these cells because of spontaneous
disintegration.
As we are interested mainly in the steady-state behav-
ior of this model, we denote limt→∞ nk(t) by n
∗
k, where
∗ is not an exponent but a label that denotes the at-
tached variable being in its steady-state limit. Eq. (1)
now simplifies to
1
2
A0
∑
i,j
′
iajan∗in
∗
j = A0k
an∗k
∑
j
jan∗j + b(k)n
∗
k , (3)
for k = 2, 3, . . . . As a technical detail, we point out that
the term with j = k in the second summation in the
right-hand sides of Eqs. (1) and (3) comes from the fact
that the number of pairs k, k equals 12n
2
k (see Section I),
but as each combination of two such cells leads to the
decrease of nk by two, the loss term is proportional to
2 · 12n2k = n2k.
A simple way of solving the set of equations given in
Eq. (3) is by introducing the generating functions [39]
f(z) ≡
∞∑
k=1
kan∗kz
k (4)
g(z) ≡
∞∑
k=1
b(k)n∗kz
k . (5)
That is, we multiply Eq. (3) by zk and then sum over k
from 2 to ∞. This reduces our system of equations to
1
2
A0 f(z) f(z) = A0 f(1) {f(z)− n∗1z}+ g(z) , (6)
where we used the fact that b(1) = 0 because a cell of
one individual cannot disintegrate into single individuals.
(Readers unfamiliar with generating functions can refer
to Appendix B for a brief primer, and to Wilf [39] for a
more thorough introduction.)
Although the solution of Eq. (6) is difficult for general
z and N , it is much simpler in our case where z is fixed
and the limit N → ∞ is studied. For N ≫ 1, the equi-
librium frequencies n∗k will be proportional to N (for k
smaller than some cut-off k0 which we need not calculate
explicitly; see Appendix C). Hence the leading orders of
magnitude (in N) of the various terms in Eq. (6) are
f(z) ∼ N (7)
g(z) ∼ N (8)
1
2
A0 f(z) f(z) ∼ N2 (9)
A0 f(1) {f(z)− n∗1z} ∼ N2 . (10)
This means that for z fixed and N ≫ 1, Eq. (6) can be
replaced by
1
2
f2(z)− f(1) f(z) + f(1)n∗1z = 0 , (11)
which has the solution
f(z) = f(1)−
√
f2(1)− 2f(1)n∗1z . (12)
Substituting z = 1 shows
f(1) = 2n∗1 , (13)
and gives
f(z) = 2n∗1
{
1−√1− z} . (14)
The definition of f(z) given in Eq. (4) shows that the
term kan∗k can now be found as the coefficient of z
k in
the power series expansion of Eq. (14). For small values
of k these coefficients can be calculated by hand from the
series
f(z) =2n∗1
(
1
2
z +
1
2
· 1
4
z2 +
1
2
· 1
4
· 3
6
z3
+
1
2
· 1
4
· 3
6
· 5
8
z4 + . . .
)
. (15)
For example, the first four terms are
2an∗2 =
1
4
n∗1 , (16)
3an∗3 =
1
8
n∗1 , (17)
4an∗4 =
5
64
n∗1 , (18)
5an∗5 =
7
128
n∗1 . (19)
To obtain the coefficients for k ≫ 1, one can use Cauchy’s
theorem, which gives the contour integral
kan∗k = ı
n∗1
π
∮
C
z−k−1
√
1− z dz , (20)
where the contour C encircles the origin of the complex
z-plane once in the counter-clockwise direction. This con-
tour can be deformed into a contour C′ which encircles
the branch cut 1 ≤ z < ∞ once in clockwise direction.
For z near to the branch point at z = 1, it is convenient
to first write
z = 1 + ζ (21)
z−k−1 ∼= e−(k+1)ζ . (22)
5When ζ has a small positive imaginary part, one can
write
√−ζ = −ı
√
|ζ|; when ζ has a small negative imag-
inary part, one writes
√−ζ = +ı
√
|ζ|. Hence we find the
asymptotic result
kan∗k
∼= 2
π
n∗1
∫
∞
0
√
ζ e−(k+1)ζ dζ
=
1√
π
n∗1(k + 1)
−3/2 , (23)
for k ≫ 1. (An alternative approach to this result would
express {1 − √1− z} as a ratio of Γ-functions and use
asymptotic analysis.) For k as small as 5, the last equa-
tion gives reasonably close approximations of the true
values, e.g., for 5an∗5 the value of 0.038, where as the
exact value [from Eq. (19)] is 0.055.
This analysis thus shows that the number of cells con-
sisting of k terrorists, at equilibrium, is given by the
power law
n∗k
∼= 1√
π
n∗1k
−a−3/2 , (24)
for k ≫ 1. Hence, because of model assumption 5, that
the severity of an event is proportional to the size of the
attacking cell, the probability pk that a terrorist attack
will claim k victims will also have a power-law distribu-
tion is
pk ∝ k−α , (25)
for k ≫ 1, with an exponent
α = a+ 3/2 . (26)
As mentioned before, we assume that a ∼= 1 (see Sec-
tion I), which leads to the prediction
α = 5/2 . (27)
In fact, for a = 1 and b(k) ∝ k, this model can be solved
exactly, i.e., with no approximations, and doing so recov-
ers the results of Johnson et al. [18, 19].
The value in Eq. (27) is in good agreement with recent
estimates from empirical data [9, 10], which give αˆ =
2.4± 0.2 for terrorist attacks worldwide since 1968.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Thus we find that the class of dynamical models stud-
ied here produces a steady state in which the number of
terrorist cells of size k, and by assumption the severity
of their attacks, follows a power-law distribution. This
feature implies that the dynamics of this model system
are characterized by self-organized criticality [3]. Fur-
ther, we find that the scaling exponent of this distribu-
tion α = 5/2 is (for N ≫ 1) independent of the manner
in which terrorist cells disintegrate [represented by the
function b(k)]. That is, whether cells tend to disintegrate
due to internal conflict, external efforts, some combina-
tion of these or other factors does not change the funda-
mental character of the frequency-severity distribution of
attacks. In this sense, the statistical properties predicted
by these models show a form of universality.
However, other statistical properties of the model
should depend on the function b(k) in a crucial way. For
the record, we give three such properties.
• The explicit determination of n∗1, the number of
lone terrorists, as a function of N , the number of
radicalized individuals.
• A terrorist cell will grow in the course of time by
combining occasionally with a smaller cell. As a
result, the size of a particular cell will be time-
dependent. For a = 1 in particular, we find that
the size of a terrorist cell increases exponentially
with time. Similarly, each cell of size k > 2 has a
probability to disintegrate, which will also be time-
dependent.
• The previous problem is especially interesting if one
starts with a single, radicalized individual. The
theory presented here makes it possible to calculate
the “speed” with which such an individual cycles
through cells of various sizes, in the steady state.
From a policy perspective, an important question for
this model concerns the difficulty of inducing qualitative
changes in the steady-state behavior via realistic inter-
ventions. For instance, the independence of the model
system’s behavior from the particular manner in which
cells disintegrate suggests that efforts focused mainly on
breaking-up terrorist cells may not produce long-term
changes in the severity of terrorist attacks unless they
are paired with additional interventions, such as reducing
the pool of radicalized individuals by other means. On
the other hand, the aggregation process, i.e., the manner
in which terrorist cells can achieve coordinated behavior,
is a clear target, and its frustration may have a strong
influence on the frequency of severe attacks. We leave
for future work the articulation of specific intervention
strategies based on this model.
Because many questions remain about the accuracy of
this model for understanding modern terrorism and its
utility for counter-terrorism efforts, we remain modest
about its long-term value. First, there is the question of
the dependence of the central prediction—the power-law
distribution in the frequency of severe attacks—on the
particular assumptions we have described here. Already
we have shown that the power-law prediction does not
depend on the function b(k), and it may be that other
model assumptions can also be eliminated, relaxed or
made more realistic while preserving this behavior (see,
for instance, Ruszczycki et al. [34]).
For example, in most conflicts, the number of rad-
icalized individuals N is unlikely to remain constant,
and may not vary slowly relative to the replacement of
individuals lost from counter-terrorism activities, etc.,
6or relative to the aggregation-disintegration dynamics.
Changes in N should thus induce perturbations to the
model’s steady-state behavior. Further, empirical re-
search may show that cells do not launch attacks with
probability independent of their size. If larger cells
launched attacks more frequently than smaller cells, it
may be possible to adjust the aggregation dynamics so
as to produce correspondingly fewer of these large cells,
thus leaving the qualitative behavior of the model un-
changed.
Existing analyses have focused on the steady-state be-
havior, but real organizations may exhibit a transient
period of non-power-law behavior during which they self-
organize to the critical state. The character and duration
of this transient behavior depends on the initial distribu-
tion of cell sizes, but for reasonable initial conditions, it
is unknown what specific behavior we should expect. Fi-
nally, the strategic utility of terrorist attacks is widely
accepted [8, 15, 21, 29]. However, the model assumes
that attacks are largely stochastic in nature, and it is
unknown whether these two perspectives can be recon-
ciled. Research on this model would benefit greatly from
mathematical generalizations that move us toward dis-
covering the most general version that still produces the
power-law distribution.
Second, although the model correctly predicts the dis-
tribution of event severities, this agreement is a relatively
indirect test of the model’s accuracy, and a stronger test
would consider the accuracy of the model’s specific as-
sumptions or its predicted dynamics. Tests along these
lines may also point out the most useful mathematical
generalizations. For the record, we describe a number of
ways the model can be tested.
Anecdotal evidence, including post-hoc analyses of se-
vere events like the September 11th attacks [35], sug-
gests that extremely severe attacks often require signifi-
cantly more resources and manpower than small-severity
attacks (see Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch [10] for addi-
tional discussion), but it is unknown whether this is a sys-
tematic relationship and whether the precise form of as-
sumption 5, i.e., v(k) ∝ k, is sufficiently accurate. With-
out access to data on the internal dynamics of terror-
ist organizations, a direct test of this assumption seems
impossible. However, research on determining what fac-
tors correlate with the severity of terrorist attacks may
indirectly address this question (for instance, see Harri-
son [17], Clauset, Young, and Gleditsch [10], Asal and
Rethemeyer [2], and Clauset and Gleditsch [7]).
Further, the assumption that cells initiate attacks in-
dependently of their age or history may prove to be overly
simplistic, and systematic correlations could produce de-
viations from the expected power-law form. That being
said, recent work finds no significant deviations from a
power-law distribution for attacks worldwide that killed
at least 10 individuals [10], and it remains to be seen
whether other kinds of systematic correlations exist. The
model defined here also predicts that the severity of at-
tacks by individual terrorist organizations should follow
a power law. Johnson et al. [18, 19] previously analyzed
the conflict in Colombia, which is largely defined by the
actions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and found evidence supporting this fact. How-
ever, a more systematic study of individual organizations
is needed to fully vet this hypothesis.
Deviations, however, may not mean that the entire
model is incorrect. Non-power-law behavior could be
indicative of the aforementioned transient, non-critical
behavior. Additionally, the model assumes that terrorist
cells only interact with other cells within the same or-
ganization, e.g., Taliban fighters do not aggregate with
FARC fighters; however, some evidence suggests that
cells sometimes do interact across organizational bound-
aries, for instance, between organizations involved in the
same conflict [1, 31], between allied organizations [35],
or when fighters from different conflicts are jailed to-
gether [25]. Thus, in some cases, the set of cells that
constitute a “group” in the sense of the model may not
correspond to a single identifiable terrorist organization;
instead, a “group” may be a somewhat amorphous set
of cells, spread over multiple organizations. Thus, the
set of events by which to test the power-law hypothesis
may not always break cleanly at organizational bound-
aries. The extent to which the network of organizational
alliances worldwide structures and constrains the set of
possible interactions between cells is largely unknown,
but likely plays an important role in the global dynamics
of terrorism.
This discussion points to a more critical test of the
accuracy of the model: validating the aggregation-
disintegration dynamics themselves. As described above,
without detailed data on the internal organizational dy-
namics or on the actions of many individual fighters, this
part of the model seems difficult to test directly. Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that aggregation-disintegration
dynamics are unrealistic, as interactions between cells
could pose security risks to the larger organization or to
ongoing operations. However, recent analyses of organi-
zations involved in the “global jihad” indicate that in-
teractions, including aggregations, do indeed occur with
some frequency, and that such interactions may be criti-
cal to the execution of particularly severe attacks [16, 35].
But, it remains unclear how often such aggregations oc-
cur, how widespread they are, and how necessary they are
to the execution of large attacks. Taking this anecdotal
evidence at face value, it still remains unclear whether
they occur frequently enough to allow an organization or
set of cells to converge on the critical state—exhibiting
the power-law distribution in cell sizes—in a timely fash-
ion.
Ideally, all of these assumptions and predictions will
be tested with empirical data to determine just how
realistic, and thus how useful, this model is. Due to the
scarcity of systematic, quantitative data on terrorism,
some of these assumptions may prove impossible to
test directly. On the other hand, by focusing on the
model’s testable predictions, it may be possible to
7test the model indirectly using available data. These
empirical tests, along with the mathematical tests of
the dependence of the power-law result on the model’s
particular assumptions, are promising avenues for future
work on Richardson’s Law as applied to the severity of
terrorist events.
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Appendix A: Power-law Distributions
Some readers may be unfamiliar with power-law dis-
tributions (sometimes also called “Zipf’s law” or “Pareto
distributions” after two early researchers who champi-
oned their study [30, 40]), and this appendix is to serve
as a brief, and somewhat informal, primer on the topic.
What distinguishes a power-law distribution from the
more familiar Normal distribution is its heavy tail. That
is, in a power law, there is a non-trivial amount of
weight far from the distribution’s center. This feature,
in turn, implies that events orders of magnitude larger
(or smaller) than the mean are relatively common. The
latter point is particularly true when compared to a Nor-
mal distribution, where there is essentially no weight far
from the mean.
Although there are many distributions that exhibit
heavy tails, the power law is special and exhibits a
straight line with slope α on doubly-logarithmic axes.
(Note that some data being straight on log-log axes is a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition of being power-
law distributed.) This behavior is termed scale invari-
ance because the power law admits the following prop-
erty: multiplying its argument by some factor k results
in a change in the corresponding frequency that is in-
dependent of the function’s argument. For example, if
p(x) = Cx−α, then
p(k · x) = C k−αx−α
= k−α p(x) ,
for every value x. For this reason, the exponent α is
called the “scaling exponent” (for historical reasons, α−
1 is sometimes called the “Pareto exponent”), and the
distribution is said to “scale.” This property also implies
that there’s no qualitative difference between large and
small events.
Power-law distributed quantities are not uncommon,
and many characterize the distribution of familiar quan-
tities. For instance, consider the populations of the 600
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FIG. A1: The sizes of the 600 largest cities in the Unites
States, i.e., those with population x ≥ 50 000, based on data
from the 2000 Census. The data are plotted as a complemen-
tary cumulative distribution function Pr(X ≥ x). The solid
black line shows the power-law behavior that the distribution
closely follows, with scaling exponent αˆ = 2.36 ± 0.06, while
the dashed black line shows a truncated normal distribution
with the same sample mean.
largest cities in the United States (from the 2000 Census).
Among these, the average population is only x = 165 719,
and metropolises like New York City and Los Angles
seem to be “outliers” relative to this size. One clue that
city sizes are not well explained by a Normal distribu-
tion is that the sample standard deviation σ = 410 730
is significantly larger than the sample mean. Indeed, if
we modeled the data in this way, we would expect to see
1.8 times fewer cities at least as large as Albuquerque
(population 448 607) than we actually do. Further, be-
cause it is more than a dozen standard deviations above
the mean, we would never expect to see a city as large
as New York City (population 8 008 278), and largest we
expect would be Indianapolis (population 781 870).
Figure A1 shows the empirical data for these 600 cities,
plotted on doubly-logarithmic axes as a complementary
cumulative distribution function Pr(X ≥ x) (the stan-
dard way of visualizing this kind of data). The scaling
behavior of this empirical data is clear, and the corre-
sponding power-law model (black line) a reasonably good
fit. In contrast, the truncated normal model is a terrible
fit. These notions of goodness-of-fit can be made precise
using an appropriately defined significance test, such as
the one described by Clauset, Shalizi, and Newman [9].
As a more whimsical second example, consider a world
where the heights of Americans were distributed as a
power law, with approximately the same average as the
true distribution (which is convincingly Normal when
certain exogenous factors are controlled). In this case, we
would expect nearly 60 000 individuals to be as tall as the
8tallest adult male on record, at 2.72 meters. Further, we
would expect ridiculous facts such as 10 000 individuals
being as tall as an adult male giraffe, one individual as
tall as the Empire State Building (381 meters), and 180
million diminutive individuals standing a mere 17 cm tall.
In fact, this same analogy was recently used to describe
the counter-intuitive nature of the extreme inequality in
the wealth distribution in the United States [13], whose
upper tail is often said to follow a power law.
Although much more can be said about power laws,
we hope that the curious reader takes away a few ba-
sic facts from this brief introduction. First, heavy-tailed
distributions do not conform to our expectations of a lin-
ear, or normally distributed, world. As such, the average
value of a power law is not representative of the entire
distribution, and events orders of magnitude larger than
the mean are, in fact, relatively common. Second, the
scaling property of power laws implies that, at least sta-
tistically, there is no qualitative difference between small,
medium and extremely large events, as they are all suc-
cinctly described by a very simple statistical relationship.
Readers who would like more information about power
laws should refer to the extensive reviews by Kleiber and
Kotz [20], Newman [28] and Mitzenmacher [26].
Appendix B: Generating Functions
Generating functions are a mathematical tool for rep-
resenting and doing calculations with infinite sequences.
Suppose you have two infinite sequences: (c0, c1, c2, . . . )
and (d0, d1, d2, . . . ). Their generating functions are de-
fined by
F (z) ≡
∞∑
k=0
ckz
k , (B1)
G(z) ≡
∞∑
k=0
dkz
k . (B2)
Both are analytic functions of the complex variable z.
Their product H(z) = F (z)G(z) is a power series
H(z) =
∞∑
k=0
hkz
k (B3)
with coefficients that are sums of products of the ck and
dk:
hk =
∞∑
m,n=0
′
cmdn , (B4)
where again
∑′
denotes a summation over all natural
numbers m and n such that m + n = k. This property
was used in Section II.
It is often easier to calculate a generating function than
to work explicitly with the sequence of the expansion
coefficients. Once the function is known explicitly, the
coefficients can be calculated from Cauchy’s theorem
hk =
1
2πı
∮
C
H(z)
dz
zk+1
, (B5)
where C encircles the origin of the complex z-plane once
in the counter-clockwise direction.
Readers who would like more information about gen-
erating functions and their use in mathematical analysis
should refer to the textbook by Wilf [39].
Appendix C: The cut-off k0 and the value of n
∗
1
The full equation for n1(t) follows from the model as-
sumptions in Section I. It has the form
dn1
dt
=
k0∑
k=2
k b(k)nk −A0n1
∞∑
ℓ=1
ℓanℓ , (C1)
which gives for the stationary state the equation
k0∑
k=2
k b(k)n∗k = A0n
∗
1
∞∑
ℓ=1
ℓan∗ℓ . (C2)
This equation connects the cut-off k0 with n
∗
1. The right-
hand side equals A0n
∗
1f(1), where Eq. (4) was used. Us-
ing Eq. (13), one can rewrite this as
k0∑
k=2
k b(k)n∗k = 2A0(n
∗
1)
2 . (C3)
The value of n∗1 can then be calculated from the rela-
tion
N = n∗1 +
∞∑
k=2
kn∗k , (C4)
which expresses the fact that the total number of radical-
ized individuals should equal N . For the case a = 1, the
definition in Eq. (4) shows that one can rewrite Eq. (C4)
in the form
∞∑
k=1
k n∗k = N = f(1) . (C5)
Combining this expression with Eq. (13) gives N = 2n∗1,
so one finds
n∗1 =
1
2
N , (C6)
that is: half the number of these individuals are single-
tons and half that number are part of larger cells.
To now calculate the cut-off k0 (for k > k0 we assume
n∗k = 0), one rewrites Eq. (C3) in the form
k0∑
k=2
k b(k)n∗k =
1
2
A0N
2 . (C7)
9As an example for explicit calculation, we take the case
a = 1 and
b(k) = B0k
b , (C8)
for 12 < b <
3
2 , where the exponent b is some number in
the vicinity of unity. Equation (24) now gives Eq. (C7)
the form
k0∑
k=2
k b(k)n∗k
∼= B0N
2
√
π
k0∑
k=2
kb−3/2 , (C9)
where a small error is neglected, which is due to the fact
that we used the k ≫ 1 asymptotic expression for n∗k for
all k ≥ 2. The series in the right-hand of Eq. (C9) can
be approximated by an integral, which gives
k0∑
k=2
kb−3/2 ∼=
∫ k0
2
kb−3/2dk
∼=
(
1
b− 12
)
k
b−1/2
0 , (C10)
for k0 ≫ 1. With these results, Eq. (C7) takes the form
B0
2
√
π
(
1
b− 12
)
k
b−1/2
0 =
1
2
A0N , (C11)
which gives an explicit value for the cut-off:
k0 =
[
A0
B0
(
b − 1
2
)√
πN
]1/(b− 12 )
. (C12)
The essential feature of this result is that k0 ≫ 1 when
N ≫ 1. At the cut-off, the value of n∗k0 is proportional
to a negative power of N :
n∗k0 ∝ N1−
5
2 (b−
1
2 )
−1
, (C13)
where one uses Eqs. (24), (C6) and (C12). Hence for
k > k0, all numbers n
∗
k ≪ 1 and are therefore irrelevant.
These features of the cut-off show that its existence is a
mathematical artifact only, with no consequences for the
distribution of cell sizes for realistic values of k.
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